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The Decline and Fall of the 
United Nations: 
Why the U.N. Has Failed and 
How it Needs to be Reformed
Nile Gardiner
Macalester College has a strong history of internationalism and 
takes great pride in both its scholarship and its truly global focus. It is 
also an institution that welcomes diversity of ideas and open debate, 
the hallmarks of what higher learning is all about in this great nation 
of America.
It is fitting that Macalester has chosen the United Nations as the 
topic of discussion for its 2006 Roundtable, as the U.N. faces some of 
the greatest challenges in its history, ranging from the humanitarian 
crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan to the threat of a nuclear-armed 
North Korea. The year also marks the end of Kofi Annan’s decade-long 
tenure as U.N. Secretary-General and his handover of power to South 
Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon.
In a recent interview with the London Daily Telegraph, U.S. Ambas-
sador to the United Nations John Bolton described the U.N. as hope-
lessly out of touch and stuck in a Twilight Zone-style “time warp” 
where “there are practices, attitudes and approaches that were aban-
doned 30 years ago in much of the rest of the world.”1 There are many 
Americans who would agree with Mr. Bolton. In a March 2006 poll 
conducted by Gallup in the United States, 64 percent of respondents 
said the United Nations was “doing a poor job,” the most negative 
rating for the U.N. in its history. Just 28 percent had a positive image 
of the U.N.’s job performance. At the same time, however, 68 percent 
of those surveyed supported the U.N. playing “a major role” in world 
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affairs, with 26 percent supporting the view that the U.N. should play 
a “leading role.”2
The Gallup poll highlights the rather schizophrenic approach the 
American public takes toward the U.N. There can be little doubt that 
the U.N.’s image has taken a beating in the past few years in the United 
States, from the halls of Congress to the towns and cities of Middle 
America.
The Oil-for-Food and Congo peacekeeping scandals have had a dev-
astating impact on the U.N.’s reputation, reinforcing the view that the 
world body is riddled with corruption and mismanagement, as well as 
a complete lack of discipline in its peacekeeping operations. The spec-
tacular failure of the hugely discredited U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights (now the U.N. Human Rights Council), populated with some of 
the world’s worst human rights violators, has added to the U.N.’s poor 
image. In addition, the tensions between Washington and Turtle Bay 
over the war in Iraq have contributed to bringing U.S.-U.N. relations to 
their lowest point in a generation.
At the same time, however, there remains a consensus in the United 
States, whether on Capitol Hill or in Kansas City, that the U.N. still has 
an important role to play, for now at least, in both international secu-
rity matters and humanitarian efforts. While disenchantment with the 
U.N. is rising significantly, there is at this time no significant chorus of 
calls for the U.S. to immediately walk away from the U.N. Both Con-
gress and the Executive Branch have focused heavily in the past year 
on advancing the reform of the United Nations, rather than deserting 
the institution altogether. Washington has looked to the U.N. Security 
Council to play a role in the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, 
as well as the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping to help prevent fur-
ther mass killing in the Sudan. The U.N. may not be loved, but it is still 
seen as a valuable forum and tool for advancing U.S. interests on the 
international stage.
Despite its myriad failings and glaring inadequacies, the United 
Nations is still viewed, in the immediate term, as an institution that 
merits U.S. investment and cooperation. How long this at times fraught 
relationship will last, however, remains to be seen, and the world body 
is to a large degree on probation. There is growing impatience in the 
White House over the slow pace of U.N. reform, and both the House 
and Senate have been discussing the possibility of withholding a por-
tion of U.S. funding for the U.N. On the international stage, while the 
United States is expected to take the Iranian nuclear question to the 
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Security Council, there is little optimism over the Council’s ability to 
enforce or even agree to a strict sanctions regime. Nor is there a great 
deal of faith in the U.N.’s ability to halt the genocide in the Sudan. In 
short, although the United States is actively engaged with the U.N., 
and wishes it to succeed, there is relatively little confidence in its over-
all ability.
The next couple of years will be an important period that may define 
the future relationship between the United States and the United 
Nations. A great deal depends on the institutional and management 
reforms that must take place if the U.N. is to become an effective 
body, and the willingness of the Group of 77 (G-77) nations to support 
these changes. If the reforms are not implemented, there can be no 
doubt that Washington will respond with budget cuts. In addition, the 
long-term willingness of the United States to work through the Secu-
rity Council in addressing major threats to international security will 
depend heavily upon how the Council responds to the threat posed 
by Iran and North Korea. If the U.N. proves impotent in the Sudan, as 
it did over Rwanda and Bosnia, it will be viewed as an irrelevance in 
terms of humanitarian intervention. Similarly, if the new U.N. Human 
Rights Council does not succeed in exorcising the demons of the for-
mer Human Rights Commission, there can be no prospect of the U.S. 
seeking a seat in future years.
Despite a series of well-publicized scandals and significant inter-
national failures, U.S. taxpayers and policymakers are still willing to 
give the U.N. one more chance. If, however, the United Nations fails to 
rise to the challenge, it will become an irrelevance, with gradual U.S. 
disengagement a strong possibility. The future of the U.N. is largely in 
the hands of the Secretariat and the General Assembly, especially the 
G-77.
There is a popularly held view, especially in the developing world, 
that the United States dominates the U.N., and that reform is merely 
an exercise in enhancing American power. This is, of course, a myth. 
U.S. power within the U.N. is limited, and all too often the U.N. is used 
as a multilateral vehicle with which to rein in the American super-
power, especially by strategic competitors such as Russia, China, India, 
and France. However, the U.N. without the United States is a greatly 
weakened organization, financially, politically, and strategically. With-
out the presence of the world’s greatest power, the U.N. would be an 
impotent body, lacking in legitimacy, financially insecure, and doomed 
to go down the same path as its predecessor, the League of Nations. 
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The U.N. needs the United States, and it is in the interests of the world 
body to undergo thorough reform, to make it an effective and relevant 
world organization for the 21st century. The U.N. needs America more 
than America needs the U.N.
This essay examines the reasons why the United Nations has failed 
in the past decade, and puts forward recommendations for reform as 
well as U.S. policy regarding the institution. It also asks whether the 
world body can survive in the increasingly dangerous and divided 
world of the 21st century.
I. U.S. Involvement in the United Nations
It is often suggested that the United States does not pull its own weight 
when it comes to the United Nations, and is a reluctant and unenthu-
siastic member. This was the main theme of a controversial speech 
given by Deputy U.N. Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown in New 
York in June 2006.3 In remarks described as “the worst mistake” by a 
U.N. official in a quarter century, Malloch Brown warned of the “seri-
ous consequences of a decades-long tendency by U.S. Administrations 
of both parties to engage only fitfully with the UN.” He condemned 
“the prevailing practice of seeking to use the UN almost by stealth as 
a diplomatic tool while failing to stand up for it against its domestic 
critics.”
The U.N.’s Number Two person chastised the Bush Administration 
because it had not sufficiently “highlighted” where the U.S. and the 
U.N. are “constructively engaged” and instead “abandoned” the topic 
to conservative sections of the U.S. media that promulgate “unchecked 
UN-bashing and stereotyping.” What is needed in response, he 
declared, is for America’s leaders to support the U.N., “not just in 
a whisper but in a coast to coast shout, that pushes back the critics 
domestically, and wins over the skeptics internationally.”
The speech was also an extraordinary intervention in domestic 
American politics. In what can only be described as the first political 
stump speech made by an international civil servant on U.S. soil in a 
critical U.S. election year, Malloch Brown rallied his largely partisan 
audience with these stirring words:
Back in Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt’s day building a strong, effective 
UN that could play this kind of role was a bipartisan enterprise, with the 
likes of Arthur Vandenberg and John Foster Dulles joining Democrats to 
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support the new body. Who are their successors in American politics? 
Who will campaign in 2008 for a new multilateral national security?
Malloch Brown’s controversial speech is part of a growing trend 
toward intervention in U.S. political affairs by U.N. officials. Kofi 
Annan sparked a major controversy in September 2004, just weeks 
ahead of the U.S. presidential election, when he described the war with 
Iraq as an “illegal” violation of the U.N. Charter, in an interview with 
the BBC. Annan followed these remarks with a further intervention on 
the Iraq issue in November 2004, when he wrote a letter to U.S., Brit-
ish, and Iraqi leaders appealing for Coalition forces to hold back from 
retaking the insurgent-held city of Fallujah.
More recently, the Secretary-General tried to influence the American 
political debate on immigration in a June 5, 2006 editorial for The Wall 
Street Journal.4 Although it eschewed specific mention of the United 
States, Annan’s article, as well as the release of new U.N. research on 
migration, was timed for maximum impact on the immigration issue, 
and arrived just as the House and Senate were working to reconcile 
major immigration legislation. Such interventions are inappropriate 
for U.N. officials and should be rebuffed by both political parties as 
improper intervention in U.S. domestic politics.
Malloch Brown’s speech was not only a highly politicized polemic, 
it was also a spectacularly unfair assessment of America’s commitment 
to the United Nations. The United States has been the United Nations’ 
biggest contributor since its founding in 1945, contributing over $5 bil-
lion annually to the world body. The U.S. gives around $400 million a 
year toward the U.N.’s routine operating expenses—22 percent of the 
U.N.’s regular annual operating budget and more than the combined 
contributions of France, Germany, China, Canada, and Russia. In addi-
tion, it provides over $400 million a year to the U.N.’s specialized agen-
cies.
The U.S. contributes 48 percent of the World Food Program budget, 
31 percent of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees budget, and 
17 percent of the UNICEF budget. The United States is the world’s big-
gest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations, funding 27 percent 
of its total worldwide peacekeeping budget. The U.S. now contributes 
over $1 billion a year toward U.N. peacekeeping activities. Between 
2001 and 2005, the United States contributed $3.59 billion toward U.N. 
international peacekeeping operations.
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To further illustrate this point, the United States is the biggest finan-
cial contributor to the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUC), providing about one-third of its $746 million oper-
ating budget. The U.S. contribution to the U.N. peacekeeping mission 
in the Congo has been substantial. If 2005 figures are included, the 
U.S. has contributed roughly three-quarters of a billion dollars ($759 
million) toward MONUC since 2000, according to State Department 
figures.5
II. The Failure of the United Nations
The history of the United Nations over the past twelve years has been 
dominated by scandal, division, and failure. From the disaster of the 
U.N. peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and Bosnia in the mid-1990s to 
the U.N.’s slow response to the Sudan genocide, the U.N.’s recent track 
record has been spectacularly unimpressive. The tenure of Kofi Annan, 
which began in January 1997 and ended in December 2006, has been 
one of the least successful of any Secretary-General. His successor will 
inherit a largely poisoned chalice, a U.N. whose image has slipped to 
an all-time low.
The U.N.’s failure has been multifaceted and cannot be ascribed to 
one single cause. It is partly a failure of leadership, combined with 
poor management, discipline, and widespread inefficiency, as well as 
a deep-seated culture of corruption. It is also due to a lack of moral 
clarity on the international stage—an unwillingness to confront acts 
of genocide or totalitarian regimes, coupled with a ready willingness 
to accommodate tyrants and dictators. It has led to a loss of faith in 
the U.N.’s ability to stand up even for its own Universal Charter of 
Human Rights or protect the world’s most vulnerable people, includ-
ing victims of ethnic cleansing and refugees seeking protection under 
the U.N. flag.
Whatever the causes of the U.N.’s failure and weakness, there can 
be no doubt that it is an organization in a state of crisis, unsure of its 
future, mired in scandal, suffering from a lack of direction, and mor-
ally ambiguous in outlook. In other words, it is a world body that 
is increasingly ill-equipped for the demands of the 21st century, and 
working its way towards irrelevance unless it undergoes a transforma-
tion. The U.N. today is best described as a sickly patient awaiting a 
blood transfusion.
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A. Human Rights Failures
The United Nations has let down millions of the world’s weakest and 
most vulnerable people in Africa and the Balkans. Its failure to prevent 
the slaughter of thousands of Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995 or the 
mass killing of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 are 
shameful episodes that will haunt the United Nations for generations.
There are echoes of Bosnia and Rwanda today in the killing fields of 
Darfur in the Sudan, a tragedy that the U.N. initially refused to catego-
rize as genocide. More than 200,000 people have lost their lives, many 
of them at the hands of the Janjaweed militias, backed by the Sudanese 
government. Sudan, a country with an appalling human rights track 
record, was an active member of the now-defunct U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights from 2002 to 2005. It used its membership to help block 
censure from the United Nations. Zimbabwe, another African country 
with a horrific record of abusing the rights of its citizens, sat on the 
Council from 2003 to 2005.
The Commission reached its low point in 2003, when Libya was 
elected Chair with the backing of 33 members, with just three countries 
voting against. It was eventually replaced in 2006, amidst much fanfare, 
by the new United Nations Human Rights Council. Unfortunately, the 
47-seat body is not a significant improvement over its hugely discred-
ited predecessor. The Council’s lack of membership criteria renders it 
open to participation and manipulation by the world’s worst human 
rights abusers. Tyrannical regimes such as Burma, Syria, Libya, Sudan, 
and Zimbabwe all voted in favor of establishing the Council, in the 
face of strong U.S. opposition. The brutal North Korean dictatorship 
also gave the Council its ringing endorsement. When Council elections 
were held in May, leading human rights abusers Algeria, China, Cuba, 
Pakistan, Russia, and Saudi Arabia were all elected.
The United States was correct in its decision not to seek a seat on a 
Council tainted by the odor of despotism and tyranny. While making 
every effort to push for reform within the U.N., the United States must 
seek the creation of a complementary human rights body outside of 
the U.N. system that would be composed solely of democratic states 
that adhere to the basic principles of individual liberty and freedom.
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B. UNESCO and Hugo Chávez
The Human Rights Council is far from being the only U.N. body to 
serve as a platform for despots and dictators. The United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) awarded 
its 2005 José Martí International Prize to Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chávez. Cuban President Fidel Castro personally handed the award to 
his leading imitator as an estimated 200,000 people in Revolution Plaza 
watched.
The Martí prize is intended to recognize those who have contrib-
uted to the “struggle for liberty” in Latin America. Chávez is clearly 
not among this group, and the award was a major embarrassment to 
the United Nations, illustrating a longstanding lack of moral clarity 
within the world body on issues of individual freedom and liberty.
Founded after the Second World War, UNESCO was established “to 
contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among 
nations through education, science and culture in order to further uni-
versal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the 
world.”
UNESCO has had a controversial history. The United States boycot-
ted the organization for eighteen years, from 1985 through 2003, in pro-
test over its budgetary mismanagement and radical agenda, including 
policies opposed to democracy and freedom of the press. The United 
States rejoined UNESCO on the understanding that it was undergo-
ing significant financial and management reform and had “resumed 
efforts to reinforce founding principles.”
The award to Hugo Chávez was an affront to the founding vision of 
UNESCO and the latest blow to the U.N.’s rapidly declining reputation 
on human rights and democracy. Aside from Burma, Sudan, Iran, and 
Zimbabwe (all members of UNESCO), the U.N. would have to struggle 
to find two more repressive regimes than Venezuela and Cuba to glo-
rify.
C. Peacekeeping Failures: The Congo Peacekeeping Scandal
The U.N.’s human rights failure has been compounded by a series of 
peacekeeping scandals, from Bosnia to Burundi to Sierra Leone. By 
far the worst instances of abuse have taken place in the Democratic 
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Republic of Congo, the U.N.’s second largest peacekeeping mission, 
with 16,000 peacekeepers.
In the Congo, acts of barbarism have been perpetrated by United 
Nations peacekeepers and civilian personnel entrusted with protecting 
some of the most vulnerable women and children in the world. Person-
nel from the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
stand accused of at least 150 major human rights violations. This is 
almost certainly just the tip of the iceberg. The scale of the problem is 
likely to be far greater.
The crimes involve rape and forced prostitution of women and 
young girls across the country, including inside a refugee camp in the 
town of Bunia in northeastern Congo. The alleged perpetrators include 
U.N. military and civilian personnel from Nepal, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Uruguay, South Africa, Pakistan, and France. The victims are defense-
less refugees—many of them children—who have already been brutal-
ized and terrorized by years of war and who looked to the U.N. for 
safety and protection.
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged that, “acts of 
gross misconduct have taken place.” A draft United Nations report 
described sexual exploitation by its personnel in the Congo as “signifi-
cant, widespread and ongoing.” In the words of William Lacy Swing, 
Annan’s Special Representative to the Congo, “We are shocked by it, 
we’re outraged, we’re sickened by it. Peacekeepers who have been 
sworn to assist those in need, particularly those who have been victims 
of sexual violence, instead have caused grievous harm.”6
The sexual abuse scandal in the Congo makes a mockery of the 
U.N.’s professed commitment to upholding basic human rights. U.N. 
peacekeepers and the civilian personnel who work with them should 
be symbols of the international community’s commitment to protect-
ing the weak and innocent in times of war. The exploitation of some of 
the most vulnerable people in the world—refugees in a war-ravaged 
country—is a shameful episode and a massive betrayal of trust.
D. Corruption: The-Oil-for-Food Scandal
The scandal surrounding the U.N.-administered Oil-for-Food program 
has also done immense damage to the world organization’s already 
shaky credibility. The Oil-for-Food debacle is undoubtedly the biggest 
scandal in the history of the United Nations, and probably the largest 
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financial fraud in modern times. It has shattered the illusion that the 
U.N. is the arbiter of moral authority in the international sphere.
The Oil-for-Food program became the hottest investigative issue on 
Capitol Hill in a generation. Investigators examined huge amounts of 
evidence relating to corruption, fraud, and bribery on an epic scale; 
French and Russian treachery; and the attempts of a brutal totalitarian 
regime to manipulate members of the U.N. Security Council.
Set up in the mid-1990s as a means of providing humanitarian aid 
to the Iraqi people, the U.N.-run Oil-for-Food program was subverted 
and manipulated by Saddam Hussein’s regime, allegedly with the 
complicity of U.N. officials, to help prop up the Iraqi dictator. Saddam 
Hussein’s dictatorship was able to siphon off billions of dollars from 
the program by oil smuggling and systematic thievery, by demanding 
illegal payments from companies buying Iraqi oil, and by kickbacks 
from those selling goods to Iraq—all under the noses of U.N. bureau-
crats.
The program has been investigated by no less than five Congressio-
nal committees (two in the Senate and three in the House of Represen-
tatives). They are the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Government Affairs, the House International Rela-
tions Committee, the House Subcommittee on Government Reform, 
and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Three U.S. fed-
eral investigations are still underway, by the General Accounting Office 
(GAO), the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Treasury.
In addition, the 18-month $34 million U.N.-appointed Indepen-
dent Inquiry Committee (IIC) documented a huge amount of evidence 
regarding manipulation of the $60 billion program by the Saddam 
Hussein regime, with the complicity of more than 2,200 companies 
in 66 countries as well as a number of prominent international politi-
cians.7 The three-member Committee was chaired by former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. The other two committee members 
were South African Justice Richard Goldstone and Swiss Professor of 
Criminal Law Mark Pieth.
According to the report, “Oil surcharges were paid in connection 
with the contracts of 139 companies and humanitarian kickbacks were 
paid in connection with the contracts of 2,253 companies.” Companies 
accused of paying kickbacks to the Iraqi regime include major global 
corporations such as Daimler-Chrysler, Siemens, and Volvo. The Sad-
dam Hussein regime received illicit income of $1.8 billion under the 
Oil-for-Food program: $228.8 million was derived from the payment 
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of surcharges in connection with oil contracts and $1.55 billion came 
through kickbacks on humanitarian goods.
The 500-page report painted an ugly tableau of bribery, kickbacks, 
corruption, and fraud on a global scale. It amply demonstrates how the 
Iraqi dictator generously rewarded those who supported the lifting of 
U.N. sanctions on Iraq and who paid lip service to his barbaric regime. 
Oil-for-Food became a shameless political charade through which Sad-
dam Hussein attempted to manipulate decision-making at the U.N. 
Security Council by buying the support of influential figures in coun-
tries like Russia and France.
The evidence presented was comprehensive, damning, and a wake-
up call to those who naively believed that the Saddam Hussein regime 
could be trusted to comply with U.N. sanctions. Saddam’s multibil-
lion-dollar fraud, carried out with the complicity of prominent political 
figures across Europe as well as thousands of international companies, 
was halted only by the liberation of Iraq by the United States and Great 
Britain, in the face of determined opposition by France and Russia. 
It is not difficult to see why powerful political interests in Paris and 
Moscow were so fundamentally opposed to a war that would open the 
archives of Baghdad to close scrutiny and subsequently cause huge 
political embarrassment.
The report should prompt widespread soul-searching within the 
United Nations, whose administrators turned a blind eye to massive 
wrongdoing in a humanitarian program designed to help the weakest 
and most vulnerable in Iraq. The fact that the Baathist regime was able 
to get away with such a vast scandal under the noses of U.N. bureau-
crats—and in some cases with their complicity—represents both spec-
tacular incompetence as well as extremely poor leadership at the top of 
the world body.
The overall IIC investigation should not, though, be viewed as the 
final say on the Oil-for-Food scandal. It should be seen as an important 
but at times flawed and incomplete inquiry that left many questions 
unanswered in relation to the role of senior U.N. officials, including 
Kofi Annan and his chief aide, Iqbal Riza.
In future years, the Secretary-General should not be permitted to 
handpick the investigative committee into a U.N. scandal and then 
pass it off as “independent.” Such inquiries will always be open to the 
possibility of political interference and manipulation by those being 
investigated. The United States should insist that future investigations 
into such scandals be completely independent of the Secretary-Gen-
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eral. Upon appointment, chairmen of such inquiries should also be 
asked to disclose all potential conflicts of interest, whether business or 
political.
The Volcker inquiry was less than forthright in its analysis of pos-
sible wrongdoing and incompetence at the very top of the U.N. Sec-
retariat, a point sharply highlighted by the resignation of former FBI 
agent Robert Parton, the IIC’s lead investigator of the Kofi Annan/Kojo 
Annan issue. Parton resigned on a matter of principle, in protest at 
the Volcker Committee’s unwillingness to take a harder line regarding 
the actions of the Secretary-General. Parton subsequently handed over 
thousands of pages of documents relating to the Annan investigation 
to the House International Relations Committee.
According to the second interim report released by the Volcker 
Committee,8 Iqbal Riza, Kofi Annan’s Chief of Staff, authorized the 
shredding of thousands of U.N. documents between April and Decem-
ber 2004. Among these documents were the entire Chef de Cabinet 
chronological files for 1997, 1998, and 1999—many of which related 
to the Oil-for-Food program. Riza approved this destruction just ten 
days after he had personally written to the heads of nine U.N.-related 
agencies that administered the Oil-for-Food program in Northern Iraq, 
requesting that they, “take all necessary steps to collect, preserve and 
secure all files, records and documents…relating to the Oil-for-Food 
Programme.” The destruction continued for more than seven months 
after the Secretary-General’s June 1, 2004 order to staff members “not 
to destroy or remove any documents related to the Oil-for-Food pro-
gramme that are in their possession or under their control, and to not 
instruct or allow anyone else to destroy or remove such documents.”
Significantly, Kofi Annan announced the retirement of Mr. Riza on 
January 15, 2005—the same day that Riza notified the Volcker Com-
mittee that he had destroyed the documents. Riza was immediately 
replaced by Mark Malloch Brown, Administrator of the U.N. Develop-
ment Programme.
Riza was Chief of Staff from 1997 to 2004, almost the entire period 
of the Oil-for-Food program’s operation, and undoubtedly possessed 
intricate knowledge of the U.N.’s management of it. He was a long-
time colleague of Kofi Annan and served as Annan’s Deputy in the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations from 1993 to 1996.
The destruction of highly sensitive documents by Iqbal Riza was 
an obstruction of justice that demands congressional investigation. It 
gave the impression of a major cover-up at the very heart of the United 
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Nations and cast a dark cloud over the Secretary-General’s credibility. 
It projected an image of impunity, arrogance, and unaccountability on 
the part of the leadership of the United Nations.
The Volcker investigation may have ended, but several other major 
inquiries will continue to gain momentum and reveal new findings 
relating to the Oil-for-Food scandal. These include the leading investi-
gations on Capitol Hill led by the House International Relations Com-
mittee and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, in 
addition to the Department of Justice inquiry. It will be many months, 
even years, before the full extent of the corruption and mismanage-
ment within the United Nations is completely exposed.
E. Questions about the U.N. Tsunami Relief Effort
The Oil-for-Food program is one of several U.N. operations to raise 
major concerns about transparency and accountability. The U.N.’s 
much-vaunted tsunami relief operation has also sparked doubts 
regarding its ability to manage a huge humanitarian project.
The tsunami disaster, which struck large sections of Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, and East Africa on December 26, 2004, claimed some 
231,000 lives and displaced two million people. It prompted an out-
pouring of humanitarian help from around the world, with an esti-
mated total of $13.6 billion in aid pledged, including $6.16 billion in 
government assistance, $2.3 billion from international financial institu-
tions, and $5.1 billion from individuals and companies.9
The huge international relief effort was co-coordinated by the 
United Nations, and involved an astonishing 39 U.N. agencies, from 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO).
When the U.N. took over the tsunami relief operation in early 2005, 
the world body pledged full transparency, in light of its disastrous han-
dling of the Iraq Oil-for-Food program. The U.N.’s Under-Secretary-
General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, boasted in an opinion 
editorial that, “only the UN has the universal legitimacy, capacity, and 
credibility to lead in a truly global humanitarian emergency.”10 Ege-
land had earlier criticized the U.S. contribution to the tsunami relief 
effort as “stingy.”11
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An investigation by the Financial Times, however, raised serious 
questions about the U.N.’s handling of the tsunami relief effort, in par-
ticular the way in which it spent the first $590 million of its $1.1 billion 
disaster “flash appeal.” The appeal included nearly $50 million from 
the United States.12 The two-month Financial Times inquiry revealed 
that, “as much as a third of the money raised by the UN for its tsunami 
response was being swallowed up by salaries and administrative over-
heads.”13 In contrast, Oxfam, a British-based private charity, spent just 
10 percent of the tsunami aid money it raised on administrative costs.
Unable to obtain figures from the U.N. Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Financial Times approached 
several U.N. agencies directly to establish exact numbers for tsunami 
relief expenditures. Many “declined or ignored” requests for informa-
tion, while others offered incomplete data. The newspaper found that 
of the $49 million spent by the World Health Organization as part of 
the tsunami appeal, 32 percent had been spent on “personnel costs, 
administrative overheads, or associated ‘miscellaneous’ costs.” At the 
World Food Program (WFP), 18 percent of the $215 million spent by 
the agency went toward “staff salaries, administrative overheads and 
vehicles and equipment.”14
The Financial Times concluded that, “a year after the tsunami, 
pledges of transparency and accountability for the UN’s appeal appear 
a long way from being realized. This is primarily blamed on dueling 
UN bureaucracies and accounting methods plus what in many cases 
appears to be institutional paranoia about disclosure.”15
III. Reforming the United Nations
The United States should press for immediate reform in three key areas: 
accountability and transparency, peacekeeping, and human rights.
A. Accountability and Transparency
The United States should call for the creation of an external watch-
dog body to oversee U.N. operations. The U.N.’s Office of Internal 
Oversight Services lacks the tools, expertise, public confidence, and 
above all, the independence to conduct effective, transparent, and 
impartial investigations into allegations of large-scale fraud and mis-
management within the United Nations. An external oversight body 
completely independent of the U.N. bureaucracy and staffed with non-
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U.N. officials (but backed by a Security Council mandate) should be 
established to oversee major U.N. operations, including peacekeeping 
and humanitarian programs.
Congress should support the establishment of a U.S. oversight unit 
to monitor how American contributions are spent by the U.N. The 
United States should set up its own U.N. oversight unit specifically 
charged with monitoring the use of American contributions to U.N. 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. This should be funded 
by diverting part of the annual U.S. assessed contribution for the 
United Nations and could be located in the U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations.
Congress should also call for the U.N. to establish an independent 
archive facility to house copies of all major U.N. documents, to guard 
against the shredding of sensitive files by U.N. officials under investi-
gation. The facility should be located at a separate site from the U.N. 
headquarters. Copies of significant U.N. documents and correspon-
dence (for example, Chef de Cabinet and Secretariat files) should be 
deposited within a set period from time of production. Such a facility 
should be funded by cutting wasteful U.N. programs.
There should also be regular auditing of all U.N. finances and 
expenditures, conducted by a leading accounting firm. In addition, 
U.N. personnel charged with criminal behavior should be immediately 
stripped of diplomatic immunity, to open the way for prosecution. The 
legal costs of U.N. officials charged with criminal behavior should not 
be paid for by the United Nations, and should be the responsibility of 
the individual concerned.
B. Peacekeeping
The Congo episode further undermined the credibility of the United 
Nations and raised serious questions about the effectiveness of the 
U.N.’s leadership. The U.N. has consistently failed to publicize, pre-
vent, and punish the criminal behavior of its own personnel in trouble 
spots around the world. Congress should make it clear to the United 
Nations that continued robust U.S. funding of U.N. peacekeeping 
efforts will be contingent upon the elimination of all forms of abuse 
within its operations. Congress should withhold a percentage of the 
U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations unless U.N. person-
nel responsible for criminal activity are brought to justice and safe-
guards are put in place to prevent future abuses.
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The United States should call for a Security Council-backed fully 
independent investigation into the MONUC abuse scandal, to cover 
all areas of the MONUC operation. In addition, there should be inde-
pendent investigations launched into allegations of abuse by U.N. 
personnel in other U.N. peacekeeping operations—including Kosovo, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Burundi. Fully independent commissions 
of inquiry should handle all future investigations into human rights 
abuses by U.N. personnel.
The United States government should pressure U.N. member states 
to prosecute their nationals accused of human rights violations while 
serving as U.N. peacekeepers. The U.N. should lift diplomatic immu-
nity for its own staff accused of criminal acts in the Congo, opening the 
way for prosecution. The Security Council should exclude from future 
operations countries whose peacekeepers have a history of human 
rights violations. The U.N. should publicly name and shame those 
countries whose peacekeepers have carried out abuses in the Congo.
Further, the U.N. should make publicly available all internal reports 
relating to the Congo scandal, and outline the exact steps it plans to 
take to prevent the sexual exploitation of refugees in both existing and 
future peacekeeping operations. Serious consideration should be given 
to the establishment of an elite training academy for U.N. peacekeep-
ing commanders. This effort should be backed by the U.N. Security 
Council.
C. Human Rights
In an ideal world, membership in the United Nations should be 
restricted to free democracies. According to Freedom House, just 89 
of the U.N.’s 192 member states are “fully free” (46%). There can be 
little doubt, though, that any attempt to limit membership would be 
strongly opposed by the G-77 countries. U.S. interests are best served at 
present by building an alliance of democracies within the U.N. as well 
as developing human rights structures outside of the United Nations.
As human rights scholar Joseph Loconte has argued, Congress 
should appoint an independent Human Rights Ambassador to head 
a new U.S. Commission on Human Rights. It could be modeled on the 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, a quasi-gov-
ernmental group that monitors religious liberty abroad and makes 
policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and 
Congress.16
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The United States should mobilize a “Democracy Caucus” to protect 
human rights and expand democratic freedoms. The new U.S. Human 
Rights Ambassador would lobby other governments in the fledgling 
Community of Democracies, founded in 2000 in Warsaw, to establish 
their own human rights commissions and advisory bodies. They must 
be a morally serious coalition of the willing—operating both within 
and outside the official U.N. system—that offers a bright alternative to 
the existing Human Rights Council.
D. The Case Against Expansion of the Security Council
A major reform that would adversely affect the U.N., as well as Amer-
ican interests, is significant expansion of the Security Council. The 
United States has correctly set increased effectiveness of the Security 
Council as the benchmark for Council reform. As the war on terrorism 
continues to unfold around the globe, as greater urgency is paid to lim-
iting the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and as the free world 
faces a growing threat from rogue regimes like Iran and North Korea, 
the U.N. Security Council can play an important and useful role. It is in 
the U.S. national interest to have a lean and effective Security Council 
that can help address these issues on the international stage. Unfortu-
nately, the most prominent proposals to expand the Security Council 
will have the opposite effect.
Security Council expansion will make it far more difficult for the 
United States to work through the Council. With the exception of Ger-
many and Japan, the voting records of the main contenders for addi-
tional permanent Security Council seats indicate that they will likely 
vote against the U.S. on most key issues. In other words, a larger Secu-
rity Council, with these nations as permanent members, will likely be 
less supportive of U.S. policy priorities. Moreover, any enlargement of 
the Council would make it more unwieldy and subject to conflicting 
interests. It would contribute to gridlock that could paralyze the Coun-
cil and decrease the probability that it could act quickly or effectively 
to address threats to international peace and security.
The U.N. Security Council’s legitimacy depends far more on its 
actions than its membership. The Security Council is by no means per-
fect as it currently stands. It is subject to delay and indecisiveness, as 
its failures in Iraq and Sudan clearly demonstrate. However, a larger 
Council would not solve these problems. On the contrary, it would 
further undermine the Council’s ability to act decisively because timely 
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action would fall victim to political impasse, conflicting interests, or 
debate among nations that have little to contribute to the Council’s 
ultimate responsibility, the enforcement of international peace and 
security. However imperfect, the current composition of the Coun-
cil is infinitely preferable to ill-considered expansion that will surely 
weaken its standing and ability to meet its mandate—ultimately mak-
ing the Security Council less relevant and increasing the likelihood 
that crises will be addressed outside of the U.N. framework.
From the point of view of U.S. national interest, there is a clear-
cut case against Security Council expansion. Analysis by the Heritage 
Foundation of actual votes (not including consensus votes) in the Gen-
eral Assembly over a six-year period (1999 to 2004) revealed that five 
of the leading candidates voted against the United States more than 
70 percent of the time.17 Only Germany (55 percent) and Japan (50 
percent) voted with the U.S. at least half of the time. Brazil, the only 
contender from Latin America, voted with the U.S. just 29 percent of 
the time, while India, often touted as a major future ally of the United 
States, voted with the United States just 20 percent of the time. The 
records of the three leading African contenders for Security Council 
seats are equally poor. Nigeria and South Africa voted with the U.S. 
just 25 percent of the time, while Egypt—a huge beneficiary of Ameri-
can aid—sided with the U.S. in only 18 percent of the votes.
Of 191 members of the General Assembly (not including the U.S.), 
Germany had the best record among Security Council candidates, 
ranking 12th in voting coincidence with the United States. Japan ranks 
a surprisingly low 41st, but is still ahead of any other major country 
in Asia. Brazil ranks 80th, while Nigeria, South Africa, and India rank 
104th, 106th, and 149th, respectively. Egypt ranks very near the bottom 
at 168th, behind Sudan and just ahead of rogue regimes such as Libya, 
Burma, and Syria.
Significantly, support for U.S. voting positions in the General Assem-
bly has fallen since 1999 (dramatically in some cases) for all the coun-
tries competing for Security Council seats. While Germany backed the 
United States in 70 percent of the votes in 1999, it voted with the U.S. 
just 45 percent of the time in 2004. Similarly, Japanese support for U.S. 
voting positions fell from 63 percent in 1999 to 43 percent in 2004. In 
2004, Brazil and Nigeria voted with the U.S. just 15 percent of the time, 
and South Africa voted with the U.S. only 11 percent of the time. In 
1999, these three countries voted with the U.S. 39 percent, 35 percent, 
and 40 percent of the time, respectively. Egypt’s record was a pitifully 
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low 8.5 percent in 2004 (down from 29 percent in 1999). India has con-
sistently voted against U.S. positions over the past five years, voting in 
opposition to the U.S. 80 percent of the time in 2004 and 78 percent of 
the time in 1999.
Every year the U.S. Department of State identifies votes of funda-
mental national interest in the U.N. General Assembly. Support for the 
U.S. voting position on key issues over the past five years among the 
key Security Council contenders has been low (Brazil, Nigeria, South 
Africa, India, and Egypt) to middling (Japan and Germany). South 
Africa and Nigeria voted against the U.S. position on key votes an 
average of 80 percent of the time between 2000 and 2004. India voted 
with the U.S. just 19 percent of the time, and Egypt just 16 percent. The 
Brazilian record was slightly better, voting with the U.S. 35 percent of 
the time. The U.S. did not receive a single vote of support from Nigeria, 
South Africa, India, or Egypt on any key vote in 2001. While the voting 
record of Germany and Japan is considerably stronger (Germany voted 
with the U.S. 64 percent of the time and Japan 66 percent of the time), 
their voting coincidence can hardly be considered reliable.
Worse than their actual voting records is the fact that these coun-
tries’ opposition to U.S. priorities is increasing. Germany, Japan, Brazil, 
South Africa, and Nigeria have sharply reduced their level of support 
for the U.S. on key votes since 1999. In 2004, Brazil, Nigeria, India, 
South Africa, and Egypt voted with the U.S. on just two key votes. 
Germany’s and Japan’s records were slightly better, voting with the 
U.S. four times.
E. The Debate over John Bolton
Finally, any discussion of the current state of the United Nations, and 
U.S. investment in the U.N., would not be complete without an assess-
ment of the record of John Bolton, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. 
Few political figures in recent American history have so polarized 
opinion as John Bolton. Faced with Senate gridlock, Bolton was sent 
by President George W. Bush as a recess appointment to the United 
Nations in August 2006.
Over the past year, Bolton has proven a forceful advocate of Ameri-
can interests, a powerful voice for U.N. reform, and a staunch defender 
of the cause of human rights. He has worked closely with Congress, 
testifying no less than six times before House and Senate committees. 
Bolton has been an outspoken critic of corruption, mismanagement, 
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waste, and inefficiency. He has shaken up an institution that has for 
decades been resistant to change, and cast a revealing light on an elite 
U.N. establishment that has long thrived amidst a culture of compla-
cency and secrecy.
In three key areas, U.N. reform, human rights, and international 
security, Bolton’s record has been outstanding, and he has dramatically 
raised the profile of issues from peacekeeping abuses to the need for 
increased transparency, accountability, and effectiveness at the United 
Nations. John Bolton’s commitment to both the advancement of U.S. 
interests and the cause of international freedom and security has been 
unwavering.
While campaigning for a higher human rights standard at the U.N., 
Bolton has also worked tirelessly to push for greater action by the U.N. 
Security Council and the international community over the genocide 
in the Darfur region of the Sudan. He has played a key role in Security 
Council negotiations pressing for greater protection of refugees fleeing 
Sudanese-backed Janjaweed militias and for targeted sanctions against 
Sudanese officials implicated in the killings.
During his tenure at the U.N., John Bolton has been a hugely valu-
able asset to U.S. foreign policy and has proven his critics wrong. 
Bolton may not be the most popular man at the United Nations, but 
he is greatly respected and viewed by both friend and foe as a for-
midable advocate for U.S. interests. U.S. participation at the United 
Nations is not about winning popularity contests or engaging in feel-
good back-slapping exercises. It is about steadfast leadership and the 
advancement of clear principles and ideals. It is in the U.S. national 
interest to have a United Nations that is free of corruption, fraud, and 
mismanagement. And it is in the national interest to have a world body 
that actually stands for human rights, rejects terrorism, and advances 
rather than hinders international security.
Bolton has not been afraid to speak his mind and upset the status 
quo. Nor has he been unwilling to call a dictator a dictator, expose the 
rampant hypocrisy of the U.N.’s human rights apparatus, or condemn 
the actions of dangerous rogue regimes. Indeed, I would describe 
Bolton as a role model for the sort of Ambassador the United States 
needs at the U.N. Effective diplomacy requires forceful leadership and 
the willingness to back up tough words with action. As former British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher observed in a letter of support for 
John Bolton, “A capacity for straight talking rather than peddling half-
truths is a strength and not a disadvantage in diplomacy. In the case of 
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a great power like America, it is essential that people know where you 
stand and assume you know what you say.”
IV. Conclusion: The Future of the United Nations
Founded in 1945 with lofty ambitions to advance peace, prosperity, 
and security in the world, the United Nations can point to few signifi-
cant achievements. Its two finest hours—the defense of South Korea 
in the Korean War and the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq—were both 
American- and British-led operations that frankly would have taken 
place even if the United Nations did not exist. Without the United 
States, the U.N. is little more than an emperor with no clothes.
The U.N.’s failures, from its inability to stop ethnic cleansing in 
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Sudan to widespread abuses by U.N. peacekeep-
ers across Africa, are legion. Inaction, incompetence, and even abject 
inhumanity have all too often been the hallmarks of U.N. operations, 
which have frequently demonstrated a callous indifference to human 
suffering.
The United Nations has gained a well-earned reputation as an insti-
tution rife with corruption and dominated by a sleazy political culture 
of “see no evil, hear no evil.” The several investigations into the mas-
sive Oil-for-Food scandal opened up an unpleasant can of worms. 
Clearly, the United Nations is an institution in fundamental need of 
wholesale reform and new leadership. Much of the blame should be 
placed on the leadership, including the Secretary-General.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a watershed 
moment in the history of the love-hate relationship between the world’s 
biggest superpower and an international body determined to rein in a 
Goliath. America did not look to the U.N. in responding to the biggest 
attack on its soil since Pearl Harbor. Indeed, the United Nations was 
largely an irrelevant bystander as U.S., British, and other allied forces 
stormed Afghanistan, the safe haven of Al-Qaida.
The U.S.-led war on terror has become a major wedge dividing the 
United States and the U.N. establishment. The U.N. cannot even agree 
on a definition of terrorism, let alone take an aggressive stance against 
it. America’s approach to fighting terrorism, from the detention facil-
ity at Guantanamo Bay to the practice of rendition of terror suspects, 
has become the subject of extreme criticism from U.N. human rights 
bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee and Council on Human 
Rights, as well as other supranational institutions like the Council of 
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Europe. Indeed, the war on terror has become a huge target for the 
U.N.’s human rights apparatus, which is increasingly posing a major 
problem for the United States. Tensions between the United States and 
the U.N. over the treatment of suspected terrorists will greatly com-
plicate any future cooperation between the two in the battle against 
Al-Qaida.
The Iraq war was another watershed in U.S.-U.N. relations. Wash-
ington only half-heartedly went to the Security Council in 2002 when 
it confronted the barbaric regime of Saddam Hussein, and only after 
intense pressure from British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The liberation 
of Baghdad was conducted without the blessing of the Council, after 
the most acrimonious of debates, which pitted Washington and Lon-
don against Moscow, Paris, and Beijing. To this day, Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan continues to bitterly refer to the Iraq war as an “illegal” 
violation of international law, much to the anger of the Bush Adminis-
tration.
Despite the rifts over Iraq and the war on terror, the United States 
still remains committed to working with the U.N. However, how long 
that commitment lasts depends upon the degree to which the institu-
tion is reformed and the extent to which the world body serves as an 
ally or an obstacle in the war on terror and the battle against rogue 
states, such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Patience is beginning to 
run out, and it is likely that animosity toward the U.N., both inside 
the Beltway and across America, will probably increase rather than 
decrease in the years to come. The U.N. is becoming more of a hin-
drance rather than a help in the fight against Al-Qaida.
The United States is likely to increasingly clash with the United 
Nations over the battle against Islamic extremism, the interpretation 
of international law, the defense of Israel in the face of intimidation by 
Iranian and Syrian-backed militias, the approach to foreign aid, and 
the definition of human rights. The next decade will be marked by con-
tinuing U.S. engagement with the U.N., but growing frustration and 
mutual distrust between Washington and Turtle Bay.
The United States will bypass the U.N. when it is seen to be obstruct-
ing U.S. interests, and will turn to coalitions of the willing in order to 
deal with specific threats to international security and even humani-
tarian crises. At the same time, America, together with close allies, 
may develop more bodies outside of the U.N. system to handle global 
issues. The United Nations will have to compete in a global market-
place of international institutions. Its privileged position as the domi-
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nant world body in areas such as human rights, humanitarian relief, 
and international development could be challenged, both by other 
multilateral institutions or ad-hoc coalitions. The U.N., with its myriad 
agencies and vast bureaucracy, may struggle to compete in a 21st-cen-
tury world that demands immediate responses to clear and present 
threats and crises.
Whether the U.N. goes the way of its predecessor, the League of 
Nations, and sinks into the abyss of history as an irrelevant failure 
depends upon its willingness to be reformed, as well as its ability to 
aggressively confront the challenges of today, whether it be the threat 
of global terrorism, the aggressive actions of a dictatorial regime, or 
the mass slaughter of one ethnic group by another. Terrorism, tyranny, 
and genocide remain the three great evils of our time, and the United 
Nations will be judged by how it responds to them. If it is not up to 
the task, then it will be time to take a bow and give way to a succes-
sor. •
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